Sessions generated by Instant Messaging and Peer-to-Peer systems (IM/P2Ps) not only consume considerable bandwidth and computing resources but also dramatically change the characteristics of data flows affecting both operation and performance of networks. Most IM/P2Ps have known security loopholes and vulnerabilities making them an ideal platform for dissemination of viruses, worms, and other malware. The lack of access control and weak authentication on shared resources further exacerbates the situation. Should IM/P2Ps be deployed in production environments, performance of conventional applications may significantly deteriorate and enterprise data may be contaminated. It is therefore imperative to identify, monitor and finally manage IM/P2P traffic. Unfortunately, this task cannot be easily attained as IM/P2Ps resort to advanced techniques to hide their traces including multiple channels to deliver services, port hopping, message encapsulation and encryption.
Sessions generated by Instant Messaging and Peer-to-Peer systems (IM/P2Ps) not only consume considerable bandwidth and computing resources but also dramatically change the characteristics of data flows affecting both operation and performance of networks. Most IM/P2Ps have known security loopholes and vulnerabilities making them an ideal platform for dissemination of viruses, worms, and other malware. The lack of access control and weak authentication on shared resources further exacerbates the situation. Should IM/P2Ps be deployed in production environments, performance of conventional applications may significantly deteriorate and enterprise data may be contaminated. It is therefore imperative to identify, monitor and finally manage IM/P2P traffic. Unfortunately, this task cannot be easily attained as IM/P2Ps resort to advanced techniques to hide their traces including multiple channels to deliver services, port hopping, message encapsulation and encryption.
In this paper, we propose an extensible framework that not only helps identify and classify IM/P2P -generated sessions in real time but also assists in the manipulation of such traffic. Consisting of four modules namely, session manager, traffic assembler, IM/P2P dissector, and traffic arbitrator, our proposed framework uses multiple techniques to improve its traffic classification accuracy and performance. Through fine-tuned splay and interval trees that help organize IM/P2P sessions and packets in data streams, we accomplish stateful inspection, traffic re-assembly, data stream correlation, and application layer analysis that combined boost the framework's identification precision. More importantly, we introduce IM/P2Ps "plug-and-play" protocol analyzers that inspect data streams according to their syntax and semantics; these analyzers render our framework easily extensible. Identified IM/P2P sessions can be shaped, blocked, or disconnected, and corresponding traffic can be stored for forensic analysis and threat evaluation. Experiments with our prototype show high IM/P2Ps detection accuracy rates under diverse
Introduction
Steady improvements on processing units, storage options, and network bandwidth in conjunction with the need to deliver "rich" data have paved the way for the emergence of Instant Messaging (IM) services and Peer-to-Peer systems (P2Ps) 17, 16, 66, 47, 44 . Such IM/P2Ps not only facilitate instant communications, data exchange, and resource sharing, but also help reverse the "asymmetric" nature of the conventional web services established on the client/server paradigm 65 . Currently, IM/P2Ps constitute the dominant source of Internet traffic and consume a large fraction of available network bandwidth 65, 31, 45 . More than 100 million users from AOL, MSN, Yahoo! and ICQ generated 900 million messages every day in 2003 14 . By the end of 2006, the IM population was expected to exceed 250 million users with 60% of real-time communications involving voice, text, and video 27 . On the other hand, KaZaA, a key P2P player, enjoys a strong following with 3 million online users on average (up to 5 million on peak) and is downloaded approximately 2 million times a week worldwide 41 . Similarly, eDonkey and LimeWire P2Ps have about 1 and 0.3 million online-users respectively 19, 46 . As a P2P -based voice over IP (VoIP) application, Skype attracted 21.3 million users in 2006 and it is estimated that another 12 million will join in 2007 4 . Network sessions generated by IM/P2Ps play a significant role in today's Internet as a major bandwidth consumer. Measurements in a backbone network showed that P2Ps created up to 50% of the traffic with an additional 18% of unidentified packets, possibly having the same origin 24 . Apparently, Internet traffic has shifted from "pure" text/image WWW-documents to instant messaging and resource-sharing dominated by audio, video, and media streams 65, 68, 31 . In a typical IM/P2P session, two peers reciprocate in terms of traffic generation and help maintain the continuity of system operations, thereby consuming about the same bandwidth in both directions; this is in contrast to the asymmetric bandwidth use of traditional Web services. In addition, IM/P2P sessions may require upto 90 times more bandwidth and many more concurrent connections than simple HTTP requests 31, 67 . Users have often considered IM/P2Ps harmless and use them to share private or even sensitive data 56 . However, it is established by now that a large number of IM/P2P implementations suffer from deficient handling of input validation process, boundary conditions, access authorization, and race conditions 36, 42 . All these security holes essentially transform IM/P2Ps to ideal channels for the rapid spread of viruses, worms, and greyware 36, 71 . Furthermore, some IM/P2Ps are even bundled with adware, spyware, and keyloggers. For instance, analysis of LimeWire traffic for a period of 45 days revealed 95 distinct types of malware 36 . Similarly, it was reported that about 12% KaZaA clients are infected by various viruses 71 and approximately 50% of executable files downloaded through KaZaA contain malicious code and greyware such as Gator, Cydoor, and SaveNow 63 . Evidently, IM/P2Ps may reduce productivity by affecting regular network operation and it becomes imperative that organizations be able to detect, restrict, or even block such traffic 56, 52 . To avoid detection by security systems, IM/P2Ps often try to "hide" their traffic with sophisticated techniques including port hopping, message encapsulation, and strong data encryption 10, 25 . For instance, more than 38% of sessions in KaZaA use dynamically generated ports instead of its registered standard TCP port 1214 rendering port-based session identification a poor choice 45 . MSN and Yahoo! IMs can "camouflage" their traffic within Web data underlying the need for application-layer protocol dissection to improve traffic classification accuracy 49 . As IM/P2Ps mainly deliver their services on the stream-based TCP transport mechanism, packet-based traffic detection systems become entirely ineffective. A number of recent P2Ps releases including Skype are specifically designed to evade traffic filtering, prevent eavesdropping, and ultimately bypass all security control using strong cryptographic techniques 11, 56 . As new-breed IM/P2P protocols are continually introduced and variations of existing ones often appear, a good fraction of traffic may go undetected should conventional fixed-port or packet-based traffic identification and detection methods be used 48 . In this paper, we propose an extensible framework that identifies IM/P2P sessions in real-time fashion so that we can improve traffic control and enhance IM/P2P stream manipulation. In direct contrast to existing intrusion detection systems (IDSs) that function off-line, we design our framework to operate "inline". In doing so, the framework intercepts, inspects, and classifies network traffic in real-time. To detect message encapsulation, port hopping, and other evasive techniques, our framework resorts to a combination of techniques including stateful inspection, traffic re-assembly, data stream correlation, layer-7 or application-level analysis, and session-based pattern matching. A unique feature of our approach is the use of "plug-and-play" analyzers for specific IM/P2P streams; they help analyze and detect unique stream characteristics and their use in the context of the framework is extensible. As new versions and types of IM/P2Ps appear, our framework is extended accordingly once corresponding analyzers become available often through reverse engineering. Manipulation operations on identified IM/P2Ps traffic include alert generation, traffic shaping, stream blocking, and/or termination of connections. A logging mechanism is also featured to stage-in-disk IM/P2P sessions for auditing and forensic analysis purposes if desired. We have carried out detailed stress tests using synthetic data streams in controlled environments and experimented with live traffic in real-world settings. Our results show that the proposed framework demonstrates excellent performance in detecting IM/P2P sessions under diverse workloads without raising false positives/negatives; at the same time, it imposes minimal overhead to examined application streams.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 outlines key characteristics of IM/P2Ps . Section 3 presents the key features of our framework and a number of IM/P2P analyzers are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 discusses our experimental effort and presents our main findings. Section 6 presents related work and concluding remarks can be found in Section 7.
Unique Characteristics of IM/P2P Systems
Instant Messaging systems (IMs) offer exchange of information and track status of active users 56 ; using interconnections among IM-servers, they also provide realtime voice/text conversation, file transfers, and on-line gaming. Existing systems including the AOL Instant Messenger (AIM), Yahoo! and MSN messengers use proprietary protocols making impossible for users to simultaneously access multiple IM-services through a single interface. We expect this trend to continue despite of various efforts on IM standardization 61, 29, 60, 28, 35 . On the other hand, P2P systems now offer a wealth of multimedia services with their nodes acting as either producers or consumers of data/resources and often organized in hierarchies according to their CPU capabilities, bandwidth, and availability; ultra-peers help balance load, stabilize networks, and improve scalability 42, 37, 23 . IM and P2P systems do have overlapping features and by integrating those, Skype has clearly benefited and has emerged as a very popular option in the field. In this section, we outline the unique features of IM/P2Ps and point out the challenges needed to overcome in order to identify pertinent network flows.
Diverse Behavior of IM/P2Ps Services
Services that used to be offered in isolation such as voice chat, video communication, sharing of diverse type data-objects, and mail messaging are now provided by IM/P2Ps in an integrated fashion. IM/P2Ps can also demonstrate polymorphism in realizing a single service. For instance, file transfers can be conducted using pipelining, batching, or multi-source swarmed downloading. To accommodate this diverse set of services, IM/P2Ps often specify their proprietary formats for message exchanges; such formats may not be honored by the underlying transport services as a single IM/P2P message may stride over multiple TCP/UDP packets or multiple messages may be packed into a single transport packet. For instance, the AIM/Oscar protocol specification states that a number of AIM commands can be shipped as the payload of a single transport packet 76 . The field payload-length carried by every Gnutella message helps the restoration of application message boundaries 12, 42 . Should routing devices support different maximum segment sizes (MSS), such devices may also yield inconsistencies between IM/P2P messages and transport packets.
As portions of IM/P2Ps messages are often generated dynamically and pushed into underlying protocol stacks on-the-fly, mapping discrepancies between application messages and corresponding transport packets are also formed. For instance, when a Yahoo! client resides behind a firewall, it encapsulates its traffic in HTTP streams. The HTTP header consists of a series of "key/value" pairs while the body of the message carries content significant only to application. When such an HTTP message is generated by a Yahoo! client, its header fields have fixed values and are quickly created. On the other hand, the body of the message contains sessionrelated information and is dynamically generated by users. The latter implies that time delays in the delivery between header and body to the transport service may generate a different network packet sequence than its application counterpart. Ta and body are packed within a single TCP packet; this turns out to be the norm in our traffic analyses. However, we sometimes observe sessions whose header and body are placed into two TCP packets; this is the case with the second session of Table 1 . In rare occasions, we encounter sessions that have the HTTP body spread over multiple TCP packets. The inconsistency in boundaries between application messages and transport packets leads to the conjecture that packet-based traffic identification methods inevitably generate false negatives. IM/P2Ps may also demonstrate diverse behavior due to their configuration and the network environment they operate in. For example when the Skype "automatic login" option is not set, a specific user login-session based on TCP transport service is established generating unique patterns in traffic. The latter can be exploited to identify the session 5, 20 . On the other hand when "automatic login" is enabled, the authentication is performed by supernodes (SNs) following an entirely different a the option is under menu item messenger/preferences/connection. approach. Similarly, the Yahoo! IM embeds its traffic in HTTP data sections when firewalls are present. Without firewalls in place, Yahoo! follows its native protocol even when its server listens to TCP port 80. Thus, traffic streams have to be checked against both IM/P2Ps native protocols and alternative hosting protocols such as HTTP and HTTPS to avoid false negatives.
Multiple Protocols in IM/P2Ps Service Realization
To improve their reliability, IM/P2Ps frequently implement services with multiple transport protocols. In this regard, the MSN-messenger uses TCP connections for login and authentication while for file transfers and audio/video-conferencing uses TCP(port 6891) and UDP(ports 13324/13325) respectively. Even the same service can be delivered in multiple transport options. For instance, Skype determines the presence and type of Network Address Translation (NAT) devices using UDP when making a phone call. If firewalls block all UDP traffic, clients behind security devices are still functional as Skype provides its services over TCP as well. Also in most P2Ps , hosts utilize multiple mechanisms to access networks and manage services. For example, to join a FastTrack network b , a host first probes the network by dispatching UDP-requests to a subset of cached super-nodes and may ultimately resort to TCP if no UDP-reply is received. Table 2 shows excerpts of traffic generated by a peer attempting to access a KaZaA network. At IP 192.168.5.143, the peer initially UDP-pings a subset of supernodes (Table 2 only shows 4 of them, i.e., packets 1-4). It then tries to establish TCP connections with the same set of supernodes as packets 5-7 show. Among the supernodes in question, the one at 66.130.102.247:2713 accepts the request and the peer joins KaZaA successfully as packets 8-11 indicate. P2Ps systems such as KaZaA and Overnet perform their search, retrieval, load-balancing and signalling operations over either TCP or UDP.
To avoid a single point of failure, IM/P2Ps often replicate features either physically or functionally. Skype clients often use login servers (LSs) to get authenticated. If a client finds all its TCP/UDP connections to LSs blocked, it can still join the network by having the authentication procedure performed or relayed by another node. Similarly, IMs often deploy multiple servers so that a single service is supported by geographically dispersed nodes. In this regard, the AIM login and authentication are provided by multiple servers that follow the OSCAR application protocol c , while functionalities regarding locations of buddies/users and message exchanges are realized through multiple servers that run the BOS (Basic OSCAR Services) protocol. The MSN's IM follows a similar approach. Finally, a number of P2Ps employ both TCP and UDP for different stages of a single service. For example, Overnet's protocol consists of location determination of content and download b that is KaZaA, Grokster, or iMesh c the Open System for Communication of AOL in Real-time. Table 2 . Traffic generated by a KaZaA-peer (v3.2.5) during the process of joining of the network of requisite files; the former uses UDP while the latter TCP. It is thus evident that both TCP and UDP transport protocols frequently participate in multiple IM/P2Ps phases to realize services. Should we be able to manipulate the ensued IM/P2P traffic, both TCP and UDP types of packets have to be scrutinized to help identify and classify traffic.
Port Hopping and Message Encapsulation
AIM, MSN, Yahoo! IMs register their native ports at 5190, 1863, and 5050 respectively, while P2Ps including KaZaA, Gnutella, and eDonkey correspondingly operate at default ports 1214, 6346, and 4661. However, IM/P2Ps often resort to dynamic port assignment to provide flexibility, making user intervention and manual configuration unnecessary; in addition, dynamic ports can avoid traffic shaping and manipulation by security devices that deploy port-based filters. For instance in KaZaA, only 20% of super-nodes use the registered TCP port of 1214 45 . Furthermore, IM/P2Ps also employ port sweeping techniques termed port hopping to help session establishment between entities. In port hopping, a host attempts to connect a remote node over a set of ports systematically until the connection is established successfully. Clearly, for the same service, the actual ports used by remote nodes in the resulting sessions may widely vary over different hosts and/or time. For instance, with the help of the locally maintained list of supernodes, a Skype client first tries to contact a supernode on the port specified in the list. As a fallback mechanism, the client also attempts to connect the supernode over ports 443 and 80 as well. Similarly, the MSN IM permits clients to use TCP-port 80, while Yahoo! IM allows for the "scanning" of ports 23, 80, 25, 119, and 20, should the default 5050-port for authentication fails. In a similar fashion, AIM-clients attempt to reach servers over ports 20, 21, 23 , and 80 in turn, should their default 5190 becomes inaccessible.
Some firewalls restrict the port ranges even for connections initiated by hosts within protected zones. To this effect, IM/P2Ps use sweeping to determine the port ranges blocked by firewalls. More specifically, a Skype-client randomly chooses a TCP port in the range of 1026 and 1040 while attempting to establish a connection with a super-node (SN). If the connection fails, the client increments the number of its attempted port and the process is repeated until a connection is established. Although most connections in port hopping fail due to incomplete TCP three-way handshakes, we have to develop mechanisms to identify IM/P2P traffic going through successfully via ports selected with sweeping. Obviously, port hopping and sweeping strategies in IM/P2Ps help provide the same service over seemingly arbitrary ports. It is projected that most IM/P2Ps are expected to use port hopping 45, 39, 38 , rendering the identification of pertinent connections a challenge. The situation is further exacerbated when ports usurped by port hopping happen to be used by HTTP and HTTPS. Here, IM/P2Ps resort to message encapsulation techniques to embed their messages to HTTP/HTTPS messages instead of using their native protocols. In the case of Yahoo! IM client working behind a firewall, the security device may block all traffic except that which is destined to TCP port 80. Should we configure Yahoo! IM to use the firewall with no proxy type of connection, Yahoo! IM encapsulates its stream into HTTP-messages as Table 1 shows. Once a TCP connection is established between the Yahoo! client and the server, the client exercises a POST-method consisting of HTTP-header and pertinent data. All header keys, such as Host and Content-Length are HTTP-defined; the server reciprocates with a standard HTTP OK message ( Table 1) . The rationale here is to foul IDSs/IPSs and AVs so that the latter allow the traffic through as benign Web-streams. Unless HTTP data portions are inspected, IM/P2Ps sessions with message encapsulation will go undetected and false negatives are unavoidable. To overcome this limitation, layer-7 d data stream analysis has to take place. Moreover, as IM/P2Ps hosts use proxy services including HTTP/HTTPS proxies and SOCKS to successfully tunnel their message through security devices, the need for layer-7 inspection on IM/P2Ps traffic becomes pressing 56 .
Mechanisms to Penetrate Security Systems
To mitigate the depletion of IP address space, NAT devices are ubiquitously deployed in the Internet. The NAT asymmetric addressing and connectivity does affect IM/P2P applications as the latter may involve responders lacking a consistent and permanent IP address. Similarly, many one-way filters deployed in firewalls block connections initiated by hosts outside protected networks, making it impossible for hosts behind firewalls to participate as recipients to sessions. Typical techniques employed by IM/P2Ps to "penetrate" both firewalls and NATs include rendezvousrelay, connection reversal, and UDP hole-punching. In the rendezvous relay service, any communication between clients is relayed via super nodes (SNs). In the cond also known as application-oriented or "deep" inspection.
nection reversal scheme, the recipient of a session requested by its counterpart ultimately becomes the initiator of the intended session. This occurs after the recipient is informed about the specifics of the session to be established through a super node. When a NAT device maintains a consistent mapping between "private IP/port" and "public IP/port", the hole-punching technique can be used to establish UDP sessions between two entities behind NATs (same or different). Both entities can obtain each other's publicly visible IP address with the help of a super node (SN) and then initiate the UDP connection simultaneously and directly between them. Among others, Skype as well as Yahoo! and MSN IMs employ such penetration techniques to provide services for sites found behind NAT devices.
To discover the presence and types of NATs and firewalls between a host and the public Internet, IM/P2P applications typically employ techniques similar to Simple Traversal of UDP over NAT (STUN) 62 . STUN allows a host to determine the presence and type of a NAT device via a coordinated message exchange with a STUN server. The latter responds with messages containing the source IP address/port of a request. As the STUN server can only observe the requestor's publicly visible address, the requestor can determine both NAT presence and type by comparing its local address with that in the reply. The heavy-weight probe sequence formed by packets 1 to 4 of Table 3 is used to determine the presence and type of NAT. The initiating UDP message from the client (SC) contains the checksum derived from source/destination IP addresses. Due to NAT, the client's private IP (i.e., 10.2.42.169) is invisible to the super-node (SN), causing the SN-computed checksum with SC's public address to be different from that in packet 1. Therefore, SN returns a negative acknowledgment message (NACK) as packet 2 in Table 3 NAT devices typically define the lifetime for their mapping between private and public addresses. For a TCP session, its lifetime is determined by its connection establishment and termination phases while for a UDP connection, the length of its active period designates its lifetime. To maintain the consistent mapping between private and public addresses, IM/P2P systems may periodically inject probes. Moreover, the churn effect caused by the frequent and unpredictable arrival and departure of IM/P2P nodes also force active hosts to probe networks regularly to obtain current network topology and meta-data 75 . For instance, a Skype client routinely send out UDP probes to various super nodes to determine their availability as shown by packets 5 and 6 of Table 3 . Compared to the heavy-weight probe sequence of packets 1 to 4, its light-weight counterparts of packets 5 and 6 involve fewer message exchanges. The Skype traffic of Table 3 clearly demonstrates that no application protocol field assumes fixed values, defeating any signature-based detection method. However, by correlating message streams in both directions of a Skype session, we can observe that the 2-byte frame ID field of a heavy-weight probing session, randomly chosen by SC, is echoed back in SN's NACK message. Similarly, the 4-byte tag in SN's NACK message is also carried by the subsequent SC messages. Therefore, traffic correlation is feasible and effective to the identification of Skype probe sessions, which is actually the technique used by our Skype analyzer (in Algorithm 4.1 of Section 4.5).
Encryption of Communication Messages
IM/P2Ps also employ cryptographic techniques to protect their communications from eavesdropping, alteration, and replay. However, some IM/P2P abuse encryption techniques to evade security systems. For instance, KaZaA obfuscates its communication streams to defeat pattern-based traffic identification systems. Similarly, Skype scrambles its traffic with various cryptographic methods according to the communication ports involved. When a Skype client (SC) cannot establish a TCP connection to a SN on non-privileged port, it then attempts TCP ports 443 and 80 in this order. If port 443 is used, Skype does not follow strictly the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol typically used by HTTPS. If SC uses TCP port 80, Skype does not respect the regular HTTP standards at all. Instead, Skype resorts to its own proprietary protocol or changes the interpretation of standard specifications such as HTTPS. Such traffic deviations from standard specifications on TCP ports 443 and 80 make it possible to discern Skype traffic in spite of encryption. The SN-reply of packet 2 is supposed to be a ServerHello message; however, it fails to follow the TLS constraints in a number of ways: firstly, instead of specifying the server's current date and time, the field gmt unix time of Skype sessions always assume the same and fixed value (i.e., 0x401BE486), clearly deviating from TLS specifications. Secondly, the 28-byte field random bytes, which is supposed to be a sequence of randomly generated numbers required by TLS, takes constant values (i.e., |02 AD E0 29 ...| as shown in Table 4 ) for all ServerHello messages in Skype, which is also a TLS violation. Finally, the portion of the message starting from byte 80 and on, does not comply with TLS. In addition to the artifacts in protocol fields of Skype encrypted messages, message size can be a good indicator for Skype streams as well. For instance, the first SC-originated message has always 72 bytes and the second SC-originated message is always 14 bytes for Skype version 1.4, while it varies for version 2.0 and later. Obviously, the unique characteristics of such Skype traffic over TCP port 443, including constant values in fields gmt unix time and random bytes as well as the fixed size of first SC-originated message can be used as telltales to identify such traffic.
Skype traffic on regular TCP ports -other than that to port 443-is more challenging to identify as strong cryptographic algorithms may be used. Even so, a num-ber of Skype design features generate artifacts that can be successfully exploited. For instance, the obfuscated Skype TCP stream is created by applying bitwise exclusive-OR operation on the original plaintext and a RC4-generated stream. In versions earlier than 2.0, Skype applies the first 10-byte of the RC4-stream to both the first and next 10-byte plaintext. This generates an artifact in the ensued ciphertext that can be readily exploited. Another artifact that all Skype version share in their TCP-streams is that the TCP "PUSH" bit is set for all messages. This forces the TCP/IP stack to deliver each Skype message individually in a TCP packet as long as the message size is less than MSS (maximum segment size). This boundary coincidence between Skype messages and TCP packets can help detect Skype TCP sessions by analyzing sizes of packets and the correlation among exchanged messages in sessions.
A Framework for IM/P2P Traffic Identification
In this section, we outline our framework that identifies IM/P2P sessions in inline fashion. In this regard, it can intercept and thoroughly inspect all incoming/outgoing packets before either forwarding or dropping the packets. We treat network traffic as sequences of application messages instead of TCP/UDP packets; this assists in identifying an IM/P2P session even if boundaries of application messages do not coincide those of underlying transport packets. We resort to stateful inspection on data streams to improve detection accuracy; in addition, by correlating data streams in both directions of each session, false positives/negatives can be reduced dramatically. Our framework dissects data streams at application-layer to uncover IM/P2P sessions using port hopping and encapsulation mechanisms. Such "deep" analysis is feasible via the extensible use of IM/P2P analyzers that can be integrated into our framework in a plug-and-play fashion. Actions on detected IM/P2P sessions include alert generation, packet logging, traffic blocking as well as traffic shaping in order to limit the network bandwidth and resource consumption.
Architecture of IM/P2P Traffic Identifier
Two IM/P2P peers can exchange information only after a TCP/UDP connection is established. By denoting the originating site as the "client" while the destination node as the "server", we can uniquely identify a connection with a five-tuple <IP c , P ORT c , IP s , P ORT s , P ROT O>, where IP c and P ORT c are the IP address and port of the originator (or client), while IP s and P ORT s are their counterparts for the recipient (or server), and P ROT O represents the protocol of the session (TCP/UDP). Within each session, two data streams can be defined, one from client to server, while the other from server to client. We anticipate that a typical IM/P2P system consists of a very large number of concurrent users with each potentially establishing multiple connections to others. To keep track of all IM/P2Ps sessions, a core objective of our framework, it is vital to organize session-related information efficiently so that manipulation of pertinent traffic can be conducted without affecting the performance of the network. The session-related information includes connection status, progress of transmissions, and application types. Tracking session information also makes it possible to perform stateful inspection, session-based manipulation of traffic, and correlation of data streams in both directions of the same session.
Outgoing Packet

Session Manager
Traffic Arbitrator To restore the boundaries of IM/P2P messages from a stream of transport packets, it is imperative that all constituent packets are stored and orderly re-assembled so that the resulting aggregations can be interpreted in accordance to respective IM/P2P specifications. Without such a re-assembly process, an IM/P2P session may go undetected if its messages happen to stride multiple transport packets, or several messages are packed inside a single transport packet. Figure 1 depicts the overall architecture of our system that consists of Session Manager, Traffic Assembler, IM/P2P -Dissector, and Traffic Arbitrator. Any time a packet P arrives, the Session Manager determines its session and creates a new one if no such session al-ready exists. The role of the Traffic Assembler is to merge all observed packets from the same stream in the correct order. A re-assembled data stream is subsequently worked on by the IM/P2P -Dissector module whose objective is to determine the application's type (i.e., MSN, Yahoo!, Gnutella, Skype etc.) Finally, packet P is handed over to the Traffic Arbitrator module and may be dropped, shaped, forwarded according to designated system configuration, or stored along with other auxiliary information into the disk for forensic analysis.
The Session Manager
We maintain IM/P2P sessions with the help of the session-table structure shown in Table 5 . Every bidirectional session is uniquely identified with the help of the first five fields in its session-table entry namely, IPc, P ORTc, IPs, P ORTs, and P ROT O. The field TYPE provides the application type for the session if it has been identified by the IMP2P-Dissector module e ; otherwise, it indicates that the traffic is non-IM/P2P . While the CONFIRM field is set once traffic correlation on both directions of the session has been performed and both streams follow the protocol specification identified by TYPE. Fields start-time and last-access respectively indicate the session creation time and the most recent instance in which traffic from this session was detected. To this effect, sessions without appropriate disconnection procedures can be identified and removed to reclaim resources (e.g., memory). Finally, the two data streams that make up the session are stored in client ptr and server ptr respectively f . Our frameworks tracks sessions organized using splay-trees that achieve amortized access/update times within a constant multiple of the information theoretic e AIM, Yahoo!, MSN, KaZaA, etc. f client ptr and server ptr are pointers to another structure called stream that records packets discussed in Section 3.3. lower bound; this is attained by moving accessed nodes "closer" to the root rendering future retrievals to frequently used nodes less expensive 72 . Every node in a splay-tree corresponds to a session under surveillance and essentially stores the information of session-table described in Table 5 . Our session tree T can be searched with key constructed by the first five fields of the session table, and some tree operations work as follows: function session-init(T) initializes a splay-tree T and makes it ready for operations on sessions such as insertion, retrieval, or deletion of a packet P into T performed by functions session-insert(T,P), session-find(T,P), and session-delete(T, P), respectively. Function session-find(T,P) locates the session for a packet P by initially constructing a tuple <SIP , SP , DIP , DP , P ROT O> from the source and destination IP/port pairs and the protocol P ROT O of P . The tuple is used as a key to search session tree T ; if this yields no result, the "dual" tuple <DIP , DP , SIP , SP , P ROT O> is formed and is used to search T again. Searches without outcome in both attempts invoke session-insert(T, P) to create a new session for P with application type set to "unknown". Clearly, the complexity of the above functions is O(log n) and is incurred mainly due to splay-tree search.
The Traffic Assembler
The main objective of the Traffic Assembler module is to synthesize packets in a data stream according to their correct sequence numbers. For each one-way data stream within a session, we maintain the necessary information to facilitate the traffic re-assembly process. For a TCP stream, we mainly use the following fields of information: state tracks the connection status of its originator and its value can be SYN-SENT, SYN-RCVD, ESTABLISHED, or CLOSE. Field ISN stores the initial sequence number of the stream, while fields total-size, and total-pkt record the numbers of bytes and packets transmitted so far by the originator of the stream. We use an interval-tree constructed on red-black tree to organize all packets within a stream 13 , and field data is a pointer to such a structure. In a UDP stream, we use fields total-size and total-pkt very much like in TCP streams. Moreover, UDP streams use the fields: data points to a buffer that stores all data received for a stream so far, data-size indicates the size of buffered data, and total-size is the total bytes of data transmitted in the stream. In an interval tree representing a data stream, each node's key is the closed interval [P s , P e ] corresponding to the start-and end-sequence numbers of packet P while the node's value is the content of P . For a given packet P , P s can be obtained directly from P 's TCP header; while P e can be derived from protocol fields total length, IP header length, and TCP-header size of P . In addition, we define function streamfind(S, P ) as returning the stream I for which packet P is part of session S.
The relationship between any two packets P and Q can be determined based on their respective sequence intervals. Packets P and Q are duplicate if P s = Q s and P e = Q e ; P precedes Q if P e < Q s and P follows Q if P s > Q e . If conditions P s > Q s and P e < Q e are satisfied, then P is contained by Q; on the contrary, P contains Q if Q s > P s and Q e < P e . Packets P and Q are overlapping if (P s < Q s and Q s < P e < Q e ) or (Q s < P s and P s < Q e < P e ). The above defined relationships between packets P and Q affect the behavior of operations on interval-trees. We define functions interval-insert(I, P) and interval-delete(I, P) to carry out the respective insertion and deletion operations on a given interval tree I for packet P . Obviously, these functions perform standard binary tree search, therefore have computational complexity of O(log n). Function interval-retrieve(I, P) finds all packets in I that have relationship of overlap, duplicate, or contain with P . Function interval-build(I, low, high) creates a new packet Q having start-and end-sequence numbers of [low, high] . If the end-sequence number high = ∞, then Q is built based on all packets received so far; similarly, if the start sequence number low = −∞, Q is built from the initial sequence number (ISN) of the stream. Function intervaltraversal(I) performs an in-order tree walk of I and lists all intervals in sorted order according to their low endpoints; this is particularly useful when it comes to packet logging. As functions interval-retrieve(I, P ), interval-build(I, low, high) and interval-traversal(I) potentially traverse the entire tree, their complexity is O(n).
With the help of above packet relationships and operations, the stream reassembly procedure works as follows: for an arriving packet P , its session S is located by function session-find(T , P ); similarly, its stream I is fetched with the help of function stream-find(S, P ); Then, function interval-retrieve(I,P ) is invoked to obtain any packet Q that has relationship of overlap, duplicate, or contain with P . If Q does not exist, P is a fresh packet and function interval-insert(I,P) inserts P into I along with its arrival time. If P overlaps with Q, their overlapping parts are checked to determine whether they are identical. Should P and Q assume the same value in the overlapped part, P is inserted into I with its arrival time, otherwise P is malformed. If P and Q have the same sequence interval, their payloads are compared; if their content is identical, P is a retransmission of Q; otherwise, a TCP specification violation is found. Similarly, for cases where P contains Q or P is contained by Q, we compare the content on their common sequence number interval. If they are the same, then P is a forward overlapped packet when P contains Q and simply a retransmission of Q if P is contained by Q. In the latter case, P is inserted into I; otherwise, P is a suspect packet. Finally, a new sequence of bytes Q is built by calling function interval-build(I, ISN, ∞) to re-assemble all packets received by stream I so far.
The IM/P2P Dissector Module
As every IM/P2P system defines it own protocol that best suits its service needs, employing a monolithic organization for traffic identification would not be a viable option in the long run. As mentioned earlier, a number of IM/P2Ps such as Yahoo! and MSN can encapsulate their traffic within normal HTTP streams. The straightforward option would have been to develop a a single protocol dissector for HTTP traffic and within its dissector to have different segments for identifying every possible type of IM/P2Ps traffic. However, every time a new breed and/or variant of IM/P2Ps would emerge such monolithic mechanism should be reworked anew. Thus, we opt for a Traffic Manager that cooperates with different IM/P2P dissectors each of which analyzes a single protocol as Figure 2 shows. Our overall organization allows for the extensibility of the approach as analyzers for new variants and emerging systems can be readily incorporated into the framework. For example, as Skype generates unique traffic patterns when it uses HTTP port 80, a new IM/P2P protocol dissector can by developed and plugged into our framework instead of modifying any existing module.
Our Traffic Manager works as follows: as soon as a packet P arrives along with its session S, stream I, and re-assembled sequence Q, the Traffic Manager checks fields TYPE and CONFIRM of S to determine the application type of P . If S's type has been determined, P is transferred to module Traffic Arbitrator in conjunction with S and I. If the application type of S has not been determined, all IM/P2P analyzers are sequentially called until the type of packet is identified. Algorithm 3.1 outlines the procedure our Traffic Manager follows to determine the application type of an incoming packet and its session. As soon as the application type of a session has been determined, all the subsequent session traffic simply passes through the Traffic Manager and the entire IM/P2P dissector module without any further intervention. In addition, to improve the performance of Algorithm 3.1, we restrict the total sizes of data to inspect within a session in both directions to a user-defined threshold whose default value is 5 KB or 3 packets. If the session's application type cannot be identified after examining this maximum amount of data, the session is declared as non-IM/P2P. Algorithm 3.1 Traffic Manager Operation 1: P ← newly arrival packet; L ← list of all registered IM/P2P analyzers in our framework; S and I are the session and stream of P ; 2: if (field application is not "unknown") then 3:
P is part of an identified IM/P2P session; P is passed to module Traffic Arbitrator along with S and I and exit from this procedure 4: end if 5: while (still non-visited analyzer in analyzer pool L) do 6:
A ← next analyzer in L; A is invoked with parameter P , S, I, and Q; 7:
if (field application is not "unknown") then 8:
application type of P has been determined; P is passed to module Traffic Arbitrator along with S and I and exit from this procedure 9:
end if 10: end while 11: if (total number of bytes of S ≥ MAX SIZE) OR (total packets of S ≥ MAX PKT) then 12:
fields TYPE and CONFIRM of S are set to be "non-IM/P2P " (default MAX SIZE is 3KB and MAX PKT is 5) 13: end if
To minimize the false positive/negative rates, our IM/P2P protocol analyzers correlate traffic in both directions of a session to ascertain that a protocol is indeed followed by both streams. More specifically for TCP traffic, each IM/P2P analyzer typically operates on the re-assembled data stream instead of the sequence of transport packets, and marks the field TYPE of a session based on one data stream of the session and ultimately sets the field CONFIRM according to information derived from the other stream. IM/P2P analyzers may dissect a data stream syntactically or semantically. Syntax analysis mostly deal with message structures and formats while the semantic part involve checks on validity of the values in various protocol fields and the message exchange process between the communication ends. As IM/P2P protocols share little commonality in their message structures, each analyzer maintains its own information pertinent to each session. As an example, Algorithm 3.2 demonstrates the functionality of our Yahoo! protocol analyzer that identifies IM traffic embedded in HTTP streams such as those presented in Table 1 . bit "Yahoo" of field TYPE is set; 7:
end if 8: else if (Q's source port is HTTP) then 9:
data ← data section of the first HTTP message in Q; 10:
tag ← data[0, 3]; ID ← data [4, 7] ; ver ← data [8, 11] (Table 5 ). It also resorts on the information derived from the stream of the opposite direction (i.e., from server) to ultimately confirm the type by setting field CONFIRM. To distinguish various IM/P2P types, fields TYPE and CONFIRM work as bit masks in which every IM/P2P type recognized by our framework is allocated one bit. By applying the procedure of Algorithm 3.2 to the traffic in Table 1 , we can readily establish the session's type provided that application message boundaries are restored with the help of the preceding Traffic Assembler module.
The Traffic Arbitrator
Should the application type of a packet P as well as its session S have not been determined yet, the Traffic Arbitrator module simply forwards P to its destination; otherwise, the Traffic Arbitrator may impose a number of actions on P and any packets emanating from the same session S according to user-set system configuration. Such actions include dropping a single packet P or all subsequent packets in the session, forwarding traffic, shaping of traffic, and/or blocking connections from the same IP source. Regardless of the action, a copy of P is stored in main memory along with its session information in order to help subsequent re-assembly operation and the determination of its application type. In addition, all packets of an IM/P2P session (including subsequent packets) and information about the session (e.g., its application type, creation time, and transmission statistics) can be selectively flushed to permanent storage for future forensic analyses. In addition to the above choices, the Arbitrator module may pro-actively tear down a connection by sending out TCP RESET packets or ICMP destination unreachable messages to either or both ends of the communication channel. The ultimate handling or shaping of stream may depend on the traffic type detected; for instance, streams generated by the Yahoo! messenger may be passed but be subjected to traffic shaping to limit its bandwidth and resource consumption, while those of KaZaA sessions may be entirely blocked.
Protocol Analyzers for IM and P2P Systems
IMs predominantly use the client/server model with the client-part often installed in user machines. The IMs server-component manages and relays data among clients; servers are usually maintained by ISPs such as AOL, Microsoft, or Yahoo!. However, for media transmissions, IMs resort to peer-to-peer paradigm. In a P2P network, nodes come together to form a distributed platform for resource sharing where all peers are often considered equal and may establish direct communications. Contemporary systems such KaZaA, Gnutella, and Skype use hybrid architectures where peers act as either supernodes or ordinary nodes according on their capabilities. Supernodes host content-indices; regular nodes attach to supernodes and use them as relay outlets for all their operations. In this section, we discuss our analyzers for the AIM and MSN IMs as well as for Gnutella, FastTrack/KaZaA, and Skype P2Ps . In addition, our framework also supports a number of analyzers for other contemporary IM/P2Ps including the Yahoo! messenger, Jabber, Trepia, eDonkey, BitTorrent, and DirectConnect 8 .
AOL Instant Messenger (AIM) System
Both AOL Instant Messenger (AIM) and ICQ messenger use the proprietary and binary-based protocol OSCAR g that is now understood with reverse engineering.
g Open System for Communication in Realtime
However, aspects of OSCAR continuously change so that new features are integrated and third-parties are prevented from connecting to AIM servers. OSCAR is considered a stream-based protocol as its services are provided through a series of commands in the FLAP-format, with each command spreading out over several TCP packets or multiple commands delivered within a single TCP packet depending on command types and transmission timing. Two types of servers exist in AIM, the OSCAR server and the Basic OSCAR Service servers (BOS). The former is responsible for client authorization and the latter for the realization of instant messaging, information retrieval and account (e.g., buddy nicknames) management. OSCAR uses a single-login procedure for clients to join the system as users contact the authorization server (e.g., "login.oscar.aol.com"), provide their account information, and obtain back a cookie used to connect to other servers. By maintaining contact buddy-lists and online status information for users, AIM not only provides real-time text/voice communication services, but can also block abusive users, deliver status messages, create chatrooms, and support file sharing, group games, as well as audio and video conference. Table 6 presents the syntax of the FLAP protocol. Each message in FLAP format contains five fields of which the first four are fixed and span 6 bytes. The field command start is the FLAP banner and is always character "*" or 0x2A in ASCII code. The one-byte field frame type or channel ID specifies the message type of the current frame with signon and data values h very frequently used here. When the message type is data, the content of the data section follows protocol SNAC which is outlined in the second part of Table 6 . An AIM session begins with a sign-on procedure as soon as a client connects to an OSCAR server via the default TCP-port 5190; the latter is configurable. Once signed-on, the client obtains a cookie from the OSCAR server and can subsequently connect to any BOS server without any further authentication. AIM has also the ability to work with proxy servers using protocols such as SOCKS4 and SOCKS5.
In Table 7 , we show a sample of an AIM session without the preceding TCP three-way-handshake. Although the client initiates the TCP connection, it is the server that begins the sign-on process by sending the client a new connection message along with channel ID, sequence number, and version number as shown in packet 1 of Table 7 . The client responds with a new connection command through the sign-on channel (i.e., ID 0x01). Both ends then exchange information for login, authentication, and authorization (packets 3-5). Once the address of a BOS server is obtained shown in packet 6 of Table 7 , the client closes its current connection and may establish a new session with the identified BOS server to finally request IM services.
To identify an AIM session, our AIM analyzer checks the traffic stream against FLAP and SNAC. For each incoming message Q, our analyzer first tests the size of Q for the current message, so that it satisfies the minimum length for a well-formed h having the ASCII 01 and 02 values respectively. AIM message (i.e., 6 bytes) and then verifies the validity of values in fields of FLAP shown in Table 6 with "yes" in column "check". For messages with channel ID of 1, our analyzer further checks the first 4 bytes of its data field (i.e., field version) to ensure that it is the valid version number (i.e., 0x00000001). For messages in the singon channel, the analyzer interprets their data fields according to SNAC (Table 6 ). Finally, the analyzer tracks interactions between the client and the server of each AIM session to verify their conformance to protocol specifications. Such tracking information helps confirm the application type of AIM sessions.
MSN Messenger
Core services provided by the MSN IM include user login authentication, management of users contact lists, online state maintenance and notification, asynchronous communication mechanisms, and information access control. MSN IM services are provided by different types of servers each having multiple replicates for resilience. Dispatch servers (DSs) initially negotiate the version of the MSN protocol (MSNP) to be used for a specific client; this protocol can be either MSNP9 or MSNP10. The majority of MSN services including client authentication, user property synchronization, and event notification delivery are provided by notification servers (NSs). Switchboard servers (SSs) offer lightweight communications among users and are predominantly used for messaging. Should a client A intend to communicate with B, A ships a request to an overseeing NS which in turn refers A to a SS server; B receives notification from its NS and finally, a connection is established to the same SS.
The MSN IM protocol is ASCII/line-based and uses TCP as its transport service. Each command begins with a case sensitive three-letter instruction followed by zero or more parameters, and terminated with carriage-return and line-feed (ASCII 0x0A/0x0D). Parameters are normally encoded with ASCII and are separated by whitespaces (%20) but UTF-8 encoding can be used as well. Requests are delivered asynchronously and so multiple requests can be concurrently submitted without waiting for responses from a server; the server should deliver either a response or error message for each request, but not necessarily in the same order as received. The parameter transaction ID in each command can be used to match request and response messages. As MSN IM functions over a network, any NS can provide authentication at TCP port 1863 by default. Clients can connect to servers via SOCKS4, SOCKS5, or HTTP proxy as well. With the exception of the authentication sequence in which passwords are MD5-encrypted, all messages are transferred in clear text, making it easy for our analyzer to dissect pertinent MSN IM sessions. Table 8 shows a typical MSN messenger session. The first client command VER in message 1 sets its TrID to be 4 and message 2 in its respective reply reciprocates with the same TrID. At first, client and server execute the version negotiation protocol to ensure that they both support the same version. The result of this negotiation in Table 8 is the use of MSNP9 even though the client supports both MSNP10 and MSNP9 as message 1 depicts. The client also provides its MSN IM version, platform, and operating system through the CVR command. In response, the server manifests its own MSN version and provides a URL to download the latest MSN in messages 3 and 4. Command USR in messages 5 and 6 help exchange information between client and server for login and authentication. To identify an MSN IM session, our analyzer tracks every command in both data streams of the session, checks its format, the validity of its parameters, and interactions between requests and responses. To improve accuracy, all parameters are decoded if they are encoded with UTF-8 standard. In addition, for any session connecting to TCP port 80 of a host, our analyzer also inspects the data section of each HTTP POST message for encapsulated MSN messenger traffic.
The Gnutella Network
Although earlier versions of the Gnutella protocol used flooding method to locate files, its later versions feature a number of extensions including intelligent query routing, SHA hashing for file checksums, file compression, partial-file sharing, and parallel download (swarming) to improve performance. To avoid flooding storms, the network was organized around powerful ultrapeers that form an overlay network. The latter is responsible for the creation, organization, and maintenance of indices of resources found in ordinary peers under the jurisdiction of each ultrapeer. Flooding is prevented by having queries be communicated among ultrapeers. Typically, Gnutella peers acts as both client and server (termed servents). To join a Gnutella network, a peer has to latch to at least one active node; this involves querying a number of known bootstrap servers or a list of ultrapeers maintained locally by the client. Once online, a peer can communicate through messages ping, pong, query, query-hit, and push. Ping attempts to discover active hosts in the network and its response pong outlines a peer's address, port(s), and information about files available. Query tries to locate a requested resource; its receiver may respond with a query hit message if a match is found in the receiver's local data-set. Finally, push allows a servent behind firewalls to contribute data to the network.
Every ultrapeer is aware of its neighbors; this neighbor list is periodically updated by dispatching pings with TTLs limiting their scope to 7 hops. A node's pong-response is routed in reverse over the same path traveled by the just-received ping and the response information is used to either create or update the initiator's neighbor list. Ordinary nodes maintain lists of active ultrapeers and update such lists any time they attach to a supernode. The descriptor query is passed from an ordinary node to one of its overseeing ultrapeers that returns a query hit if the request can be locally satisfied; otherwise, the query is delegated to neighboring ultrapeers. As soon as the requested resource has been located, a standard HTTP session is established directly between the initiator and provider to download the requested file making it hard to differentiate Gnutella from Web traffic.
A conversation between an ordinary node and an ultrapeer begins with a Gnutella three-way handshake procedure. In particular, Table 9 shows two sessions initiated by a peer: the first fails due to overload at the target ultrapeer as packet 1 and 2 depict. On the other hand, packets 3-5 show a successful join. The client's greeting Table 9 . Traffic generated by a Gnutella peer attempting to join the network message contains the banner string GNUTELLA CONNECT/0.6 and a number of key:value pairs, specifying its capabilities and functionalities. For instance, AcceptEncoding indicates the sender can decompress incoming messages, X-Ultrapeer specifies whether the sender is an ultrapeer, while X-Query-Routing and GGEP signal a client's support for query routing protocol and Gnutella Generic Extension Protocol (GGEP). Some clients even include information for authentication and encryption as shown by FP-1a and FP-auth-Challenge of packet 3. In its response, the server includes the banner GNUTELLA/0.6 200 OK, manifests its ultrapeer status with key X-Ultrapeer set to True, indicates acceptance of compressed messages with AcceptEncoding set to deflate, and signals that it can compress its transmitted messages as well by having Content-Encoding set to deflate. Authentication and encryption related information may be included in the key FP-1b of message 4. The third step of the handshake completes with the client sending back a message starting with banner GNUTELLA/0.6 200 OK; subsequently, the client node can look for files dispersed in the network. To identify a Gnutella session, our analyzer examines all banner strings (i.e., GNUTELLA CONNECT/0.6 and GNUTELLA/0.6) appearing in messages and the interactions between the peers of the session (i.e., GNUTELLA CONNECT/0.6 from client followed by GNUTELLA/0.6 from server and finally GNUTELLA/0.6 from client). In addition, it dissects some of the <key:value> pairs as information contained in such pairs helps in the analysis of subsequent messages. More specifically, information in key X-Ultrapeer is used to construct a list of potential Gnutella super nodes, which can be used to further verify the application types for sessions involving hosts in the list.
The FastTrack Protocol and KaZaA Network
The FastTrack protocol used by KaZaA, Grokster, and iMesh P2P systems, is a proprietary suite that integrates a number of advanced features including peer hierarchy, resumption of interrupted downloads, and simultaneous downloading of file segments from multiple sites. Joining peers are classified as either super or ordinarynodes based on system characteristics. Supernodes act as directory facilities for sets of regular nodes. An ordinary node initially resorts to a hard-coded list of supernodes to join the network; each supernode is described by the template <IP:port>.
Once attached, a peer may update its supernode list to better reflect its current environment. At the same time, the node uploads to its supernode a list of its files to-be-shared. A query is routed to the supernode of the requesting peer for identifying a site holding the sought file; eventually, the HTTP protocol helps transfer the file from the holding peer to the requesting peer. To prevent the development of open-source clones and defeat detection by security systems, FastTrack encrypts all messages among supernodes and most messages from ordinary nodes to supernodes, making it challenging to identify such traffic. Even so, reverse engineering is still possible for communications between ordinary nodes and supernodes since initialization data for encryption algorithms -not public key encryptions-are dispatched in clear text.
KaZaA uses both TCP/UDP layers and Table 10 shows the format for its handshake request, handshake response, ping, and pong messages. An ordinary node may try multiple methods to join the network. For instance, it may use flooding by sending UDP-pings to all its supernodes, may attempt to establish TCP connections with multiple supernodes at the same time and expect a response from any one of them, or use UDP and TCP alternatively until a working supernode is located. When a TCP-connection gets established, the initiating peer sends a handshake Table 10 . KaZaA's syntax for handshake request, handshake response, ping, and pong messages request to the supernode containing a random number (4 bytes), a seed (4 bytes) for encoding and encryption purposes, and the encryption type (4 bytes), which is encoded with the help of the seed. The encoding algorithm in question has been reverse engineered 26, 58 . Should the supernode accept the request, it ships back a handshake response containing its own encryption seed and type, while the latter is encoded with the same algorithm as that of the ordinary node. Based on the seeds provided by both ends of the session, the supernode and the ordinary node can compute encryption keys for their incoming and outgoing data streams, and all subsequent messages are encrypted using the resulting keys 26,58 . Table 11 . A typical UDP-based portion of KaZaA session with ping and pong messages
When the underlying transport protocol is UDP, the encryption type is transferred in clear-text, making it straightforward to identify a UDP-based KaZaA session. We show a sample UDP-based KaZaA session with the supernode using UDP port 2713 instead of the default port 1214 in Table 11 ; the ordinary node sends a ping and the supernode answers with a pong. Both sides of the session agree to use encryption type 0xA9 among the 100 types of encryption available for their subsequent communications. To identify a UDP-or TCP-based KaZaA session, our analyzer scans messages for their syntax and semantics conformance to the FastTrack protocol. The analyzer examines values appearing in fields specified in column check of Tables 10 and 11 for legitimate values. Since all messages except the first two in a KaZaA session (TCP or UDP) are encrypted and cannot be dissected without being decrypted first, our protocol analyzer always dissects the first two messages of each session according to the FastTrack protocol for establishing potential KaZaA traffic.
The Skype VoIP System
As a voice over IP (VoIP) application based on P2P technology, Skype has gained in popularity after its initial launch 30 . Since 2003, more than twenty different Skype versions have been released. To facilitate inter-operations, many VoIP systems are constructed according to the standard specification of Session Initiation Protocol (SIP). In contrast, Skype resorts to proprietary protocols for signalling and media delivery. In addition, communications in Skype are obfuscated or end-to-end encrypted with strong cryptographic algorithms such as RSA, AES, and RC4. Furthermore, its ability to detect firewalls and NATs offers Skype the capability to penetrate and circumvent network security systems 5, 20 . Finally, with the help of information on network environments and security restrictions, Skype automatically adjusts its behavior including transport services (TCP and/or UDP), communication ports, and message exchange procedures avoiding all together its manual user configuration.
In a way reminiscent to KaZaA, Skype uses an overlay P2P network with three main components: login server (LS), supernode (SN), and Skype client (SC). LSs authenticate SCs and grant the latter access rights to the network. SNs route SCmessages to appropriate destinations, relay login messages between LSs and SCs, and handle traffic between SCs should the latter are NAT/firewall-restricted. The SCs are essentially the user interface to Skype functionalities including call initiation, instant messaging and file transferring 7 . To join the network, an SC attempts to contact an SN whose information is locally stored and kept up-to-date. Information on several bootstrap-SNs is hard-coded into Skype binaries to help first-time SCs obtain updated lists of currently available SNs. The SC transport service can be either TCP or UDP i depending on the network environment. If resident behind security devices, a client attempts to initiate connections to an SN using TCP ports 443 (HTTPS) and 80 (HTTP). In general, Skype uses arbitrary ports when UDP is the transport option; the only exception to this rule is when bootstrap-SNs are contacted and in this case port 33033 is used.
Through analysis and correlation of Skype sessions generated by various versions, we have established that each Skype UDP message has a header consisting of a frame ID (2 bytes) and function type (1 bytes) and a message body whose size may vary and in most cases its content is obfuscated with the help of the RC4 encryption method. Frame IDs are used to distinguish different sessions while function types determine the constructions and interpretations of message bodies. In Skype signalling, UDP messages are mainly used for NAT detection and SN availability probing; the former is deemed as heavy-weight probing since it consists of multi-round information SCs and SNs exchanges while the latter is a light-weight procedure as it involves only a single messaging round. Although such UDP probes are very similar among different Skype versions, the size of their messages may vary. Table 12 depicts the communications between a SC/SN pair in Skype version 1.3.0.60 at the very beginning of an SC execution. For comparison, we use the same setting for the traffic in Tables 12 and 3 .
Our traffic analysis confirms that the first UDP message by SCs is always 14 bytes for all versions upto 2.0 as shown in Table 12 . However, this initial message shows varying sizes after version 2.0. packet 3 is 0x03, indicating a retransmitted message by SC; in addition to using the same frame ID, this message also echoes back the 4-byte tag in the NACK and includes the IP address of the SN (i.e., 71.207.146.44). The SN-dispatched packet 4 has a different frame ID from packet 3 and its message body is entirely obfuscated. However, as our analysis shows, the message with length of 18 bytes indicates that the particular SN can serve the requesting client. The SC establishes a TCP connection with this SN on port 12653 as packets 5 to 8 of Table 12 show. In contrast, packet 4 of Table 3 is 53 bytes long, implying that the just-contacted SN is busy and so the SC request is redirected to other SNs as packets 5 and 6 demonstrate. if (P is the first packet of I in session S) and (type is OBFUSCATE) and (size of P >= 18) then 5:
ID is store in I; TYPE of S is set to Skype 6: end if 7: else 8:
if (type is NACK) and (length of P is 11) and (ID is the same as that stored by client) then 9:
CONFIRM of S is set and a Skype session is detected 10:
else if (type is OBFUSCATE) and (length of P is 18, 51, or 53) then 11:
CONFIRM of S is set and a Skype session is detected 12:
end if 13: end if 14: if (both TYPE and CONFIRM of S is set to Skype) then 15:
application of S is set to Skype 16: end if 17: P is handed over to Traffic Arbitrator (TA) Skype services such as authentication, buddy search, and call initiation follow different protocols and consequently generate different sequences and/or templates of traffic. As these sequences demonstrate diverse characteristics and share few commonalities, we have no other choice but design various mini-analyzers that cover all aspects of Skype generated traffic. For brevity, we only present in Algorithm 4.1 the procedure followed by our framework to specifically identify Skype UDP probing discussed above. This mini-analyzer is based on traffic correlation to identify the probing procedure. The first client-message of a session is examined to ensure that its payload is longer than or equal to 18 bytes and its function type is "OBFUSCATE" (i.e., 0x02). A positive outcome tentatively marks the session as Skype. Then, server-dispatched messages are used to finally verify the session. For heavy-weight UDP probing, the first message from the SN always has function type of NACK and payload size of 11 bytes as mentioned earlier. In contrast, the SN typically uses function type of "OBFUSCATE" in light-weight UDP probing. Algorithm 4.1 handles both heavy and light-weight probing appropriately and confirms pertinent sessions accordingly.
Experimental Evaluation
We have implemented our IM/P2P framework in C and incorporated it into FortiGate's IPS module. FortiGate is a stand-alone network device providing firewall, anti-virus, and IDS/IPS functionalities 34 . Its modularized architecture allows for the seamless coupling of new packages and forms the basis for its multi-modal operation. In particular, we have integrated our framework into FortiGate-800 that features 4 Gigabyte main memory and is prorated to handle upto 400 Mbps traffic and can maintain up-to one million connections per second. We have established the correct operation of the suggested framework in the controlled testbed environment of Figure 3 and evaluated its operation through deployment in real-world networks as well. Section 5.1 outlines our baseline experimentation while section 5.2 presents our scalability experimentation in our controlled test environment, and finally Section 5.3 discusses representative outcomes of the framework's deployment in real networks.
While working with the controlled testbed environment of Figure 3 , we use a number of machines to either execute clients for various IM systems or act as peers -ordinary nodes or supernodes-for P2P networks. All test machines use Windows2000 or Linux and connect to the FortiGate via a 100/1000 Mbps switch. To verify the behavior of our framework, we used the traffic sniffer Ethereal 22 on a dedicated machine (shown as Sniffer in Figure 3 ). The sniffer captures data exchanged between test machines and our framework.
Baseline Behavior of Our Framework
To establish the baseline operation of our framework in the presence of port hopping and/or use of dynamic ports, we experiment with all our IM/P2Ps analyzers 8 brevity, we discuss our findings involving a Yahoo!-client login session as well as a session with a KaZaA-client.
We install a Yahoo!-client on test machine 1, and configure it with no firewall connection-type implying that its user believes there is no security device involved. In actuality though, we position FortiGate between the internal network where the Yahoo!-client resides and the external network.
• We initially set the framework to forward all identified Yahoo!-sessions and use the Sniffer to capture all communications. We show portion of the ensued traffic in Table 13 . Using the normal TCP three-way handshake procedure, the client establishes a TCP connection with the Yahoo!-IM server at its default 5050 port. In its first subsequent message in packet 1, the client dispatches a "service verify" request (with type 0x4C) along with its supported version (0x0B) and status ("available"). Through its Yahoo! analyzer, our framework tentatively marks the connection as Yahoo! IM session. As soon as the server replies with packet 2 accepting the request and granting access rights, our framework correlates the information of packet 2 with what it has already "seen" in the other direction of the session and confirms the session type. As the configured counter-action is set to forwarding, the session "flows" through the framework with no obstruction. counter-measure on identified Yahoo! sessions: forwarding 1 C:4000→S:5050 YMSG|00 0B 00 00 00 00 00 4C 00 client msg; ver: 0x0B; 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00| type: VERIFY (0x4C); 2 S:5050→C:4000 YMSG |00 00 00 00 00 5C 00 server reply; ver: 0x00; 57 00 00 00 01 7A 60 ...| type: AUTHENTICATE (0x5C); counter-measure on identified Yahoo! sessions: blocking 1 C:4058→S:5050 YMSG|00 0B 00 00 00 00 00 4C 00 client message: ver: 0x0B; 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00| type: VERIFY (0x4C); 2 C:4058→S:5050 (FIN|ACK) connection closed by client side 3 C:4063→S:23 YMSG|00 0B 00 00 00 00 00 4C 00 ...| Telnet port 4 C:4064→S:80 YMSG|00 0B 00 00 00 00 00 4C 00 ..| HTTP Web server 5 C:4065→S:21 (SYN) FTP control port 6 C:4066→S:25 YMSG|00 0B 00 00 00 00 00 4C 00 ...| SMTP 7 C:4067→S:119 YMSG|00 0B 00 00 00 00 00 4C 00 ...| NNTP 8 C:4068→S:20 YMSG|00 0B 00 00 00 00 00 4C 00 ...| FTP data port 9 C:4070→S:5050 YMSG|00 0B 00 00 00 00 00 4C 00 ...| standard port Table 13 . Procedure for a Yahoo!-client to join the network at the presence of our framework
• We next configure FortiGate to block all identified Yahoo!-sessions. While repeating the above Yahoo!-IM login process, we generate the traffic shown in the second portion of Table 13 . By correlating information from the client-initiated request and the server's reply -the latter not shown in Table 13,-our framework confirms the session as Yahoo!-IM and blocks it. The client issues packet 2 terminating the attempt to port 5050 after a specified time period elapses and subsequently tries to contact the server over ports 23, 80, 21, 25, 119 and 20. These ports are for the provision of telnet, Web-server, FTP-control, SMTP, NNTP, and FTP-data services respectively. Through correlation of streams, FortiGate identifies and blocks all attempted Yahoo! IM sessions regardless of the ports attempted. It is worth pointing out that the Yahoo!-server does not listen to TCPport 21 and so the connection attempted by packet 5 is not successful as the normal TCP three-way handshake procedure fails. In contrast, the server provides services over ports 23, 80, 25, 119 , and 20; the Yahoo!-client can dispatch messages to the server once TCP connection has been established. Moreover, the payloads of packets 3, 4, 6, 7 and 8 start with YMSG which is the banner for Yahoo!-IM messages indicating that no message encapsulation occurs.
• By setting FortiGate's counter-measure to reset connection for identified IM/P2P sessions, we observe that Yahoo! sessions similar to those shown in Table 13 are terminated with TCP-Reset packets dispatched by our module instead of the normal disconnection procedure. Similarly, our framework appropriately delivers all prescribed actions in all occasions; these actions also include reset client, reset server, block source-IP, and block destination-IP with marginal time overheads. Next, we configure the Yahoo!-client on test machine 1 with firewall with no proxy connection-type to have Yahoo!-IM use its encapsulation technique to "penetrate" the firewall. By repeating the above testing procedure multiple times and with the help of the Sniffer we capture the resulting traffic, a portion of which is shown in Table 1 . If we compare the second (TCP) session of Table 1 with that  represented by packet 4 of Table 13 , different patterns occur. Although in both cases the respective servers listen to TCP-port 80, the session shown in Table 1 has its data section encapsulated in HTTP messages; in addition, a single Yahoo!-IM message is split into multiple TCP packets transport as the first client-initiated message of Table 1 depicts. Our framework identifies correctly all such Yahoo!-IM sessions and delivers appropriate counter-action.
We derive similar findings when experimenting with the entire range of IM/P2P systems 8 as our framework is based on layer-7 analysis. The latter helps successfully deal with encapsulation to IM/P2P 2p protocols, spread of application messages into multiple transport packets, placement of multiple messages in a single packet as well as use of evasion techniques in the test-environment of Figure 3 .
To assess the capability of our framework on the recognition of P2P sessions and the use of dynamic ports in the context of our test environment, we monitor a KaZaA-client connected to a respective overlay-network. Pertinent client-to-server connections are facilitated with the help of a list of approximately 200 supernodes -in the format of <IP:port>-found in the client's registry j . We initially configure FortiGate to forward all KaZaA traffic. While operating the client for a long time, we extract the content of its supernode list every 30 minutes; we then aggregate this data to obtain the statistics of Figure 4 regarding the use of ports versus nodes. The figure clearly shows that only a very small fraction of supernodes -the long peak that corresponds to only 1.6%-uses the default port 1214 for service. Most of the KaZaA supernodes use ports within the [1024, 4054] range; although some small peaks exist in Figure 4 , the use of dynamic ports appears to be relatively uniform.
By changing FortiGate's action to blocking and with the help of the Sniffer, we establish that our framework successfully intercepts and drops all KaZaA traffic despite the ever changing use of ports and supernodes by the client.
Scalability and Performance Under Diverse Synthetic Workloads
To ascertain the capabilities of our framework in handling very large numbers of concurrent IM/P2P sessions and successfully tracking the states of such sessions, we use the testbed of Figure 5 . In this context, we recreate IM/P2P flows from the Sniffer-captured sessions of section 5.1 9 and feed them into FortiGate with the help of an in-house developed IPS testing-system called Tester. The above flows are termed foreground traffic. We generate such foreground traffic by either using a single-type of IM/P2Ps flow or mixing a number of IM/P2P streams with different ratios. As our objective is to establish the behavior of our framework in light of diverse workloads, we also inject non-IM/P2P streams into the testbed of Figure 5 . Non-IM/P2P streams make up what we call background traffic and are generated with the help of CAW WebAvalanche and CAW WebReflector devices, typically used for system and network equipment testing 74 . CAW WebAvalanche and CAW WebReflector help create HTTP requests and replies to emulate the behavior of Internet users and "ordinary" traffic characteristics in terms of intensity and duration of sessions. These HTTP requests and replies feature on average payloads of 200 and 1000 bytes respectively 53 . While performing stress-tests with the testbed of Figure 5 , we vary the number of concurrent IM/P2P sessions from 1 to 400,000 and that of HTTP traffic from 10,000 to 750,000 to investigate the scalability of our framework. The selection of the above session ranges that we experiment with is bounded by the 4 Gigabytes memory used by FortiGate-800. In particular, if n f , n b represent the number of foreground and background sessions and S f , S b express in bytes the main-memory requirements for managing single foreground/background sessions in our framework, then the total memory required is M =n f S f +n b S b bytes. Background sessions are permitted to flow through the device without further inspection from our framework after only a few messages have been analyzed. On the other hand, foreground sessions may take upto the maximum allocated buffer space if IM/P2P traffic is userconfigured to be logged for forensic analysis k . In the worst case, we may have only IM/P2Ps traffic coming into the framework requiring M ′ =n f S f bytes; should n f is 1,000,000 and in the average each session uses S f =4 Kbytes, we are faced with buffer space depletion. In a different scenario where 50% of the concurrent connection are IM/P2Ps -originated, n f =500,000, n s =500,000, and on average b f =27 Kbytes and S b =3 Kbytes, we exceed the available buffer space. The above analysis underlines the fact that the memory of FortiGate-800 may become the performance bottleneck Fig. 6 . Deployment of our framework in France, P.R. China and United States once we reach one million concurrent sessions.
In the results we discuss here, we use the Yahoo!-IM session segment depicted in the second portion of Table 1 to create the foreground traffic. The packets of this segment are split into two parts: the first containing the normal TCP threeway handshake process (not shown in Table 1 ) and packets 1-2. The second part consists of all remaining packets as well as the normal disconnection procedure (also not shown in the Table 1 ). The Tester replays the trace-derived packets to FortiGate with source and destination IP/port information modified on-the-fly l . We configure our framework to generate an alert when the TYPE of a session is tentatively marked as IM/P2P and to yield a second alert when the CONFIRM-ation of a session finally occurs. Table 14 presents the results for tests we have carried out in conjunction with the Yahoo! traffic. We obtained similar results while experimenting with different types of traffic including MSN, AIM, KaZaA, and Skype as well as combinations but we restrict our discussion here for brevity. In test case 1, the Tester replays the first half of the trace and pauses. Then, WebAvalanche opens varying number of HTTP sessions to WebReflector as shown in the columns of Table 14 (e.g., column "10,000" indicates ten thousand simultaneously open sessions of background HTTP traffic are generated). WebReflector reciprocates for each request received and responds with a Web page without any delay. 500 ms after its pause, the Tester resumes its replay procedure by injecting the second half of the foreground traffic into FortiGate. We observe the behavior of FortiGate and compute its detection precision, which is defined as the ratio between Yahoo! sessions identified by FortiGate and total replayed Yahoo! sessions. The first row of Table 14 shows the outcome of our framework as the number of HTTP sessions gradually increases upto 750,000. Table 14 . Session identification rates of the proposed framework under diverse workloads
Test case 2 is identical to 1 except that the WebReflector now delays its response to each HTTP request by half a second, attempting to lengthen the HTTP sessions and therefore forcing FortiGate to endure a much longer period with sustained concurrent sessions. In case 3, the Tester replays the first portion of Yahoo! traffic 10,000 times simultaneously. When the Tester pauses, the WebAvalanche creates concurrent HTTP sessions similarly to those of case 1 and the WebReflector responds for every received request without delay. Subsequently, the Tester resumes its replay process and feeds the second half of the trace into the testbed 10,000 times. Case 4 builds on 3 but there is a 0.5 second delay between every HTTP reply and request. Cases 5, 7, 9, and 11 are similar to 3 but the number of Yahoo! sessions ranges from 100,000 to 400,000. Likewise, cases 6, 8, 10 and 12 are similar to 4 with the number of IM/P2P sessions varied from 100,000 to 400,000.
The results of Table 14 indicate that our proposed framework correctly identifies Yahoo! streams as long as active sessions are under one million regardless of the types and mixtures of the IM/P2P and non-IM/P2P sessions. When the workloads feature in excess of one million sessions and significant time delays are introduced between HTTP requests and replies, which effectively lengthens the period of sustained concurrent sessions, FortiGate fails to properly identify a limited number of Yahoo! sessions (cases 10-12 with 750,000 background sessions). It is worth mentioning however that while examining FortiGate's event-log, we have established that even missed Yahoo! sessions are still tentatively tagged as such. By simply using an alternate session eviction policy rather than the default LRU policy and staging-out sessions with application type non-IM/P2P first, we have attained 100% accuracy detection in all above cases. Our next goal is to quantify the impact of our framework on the response time of normal applications as well as its overhead on non-IM/P2P sessions. We first remove our IM/P2Ps module from the FortiGate device of Figure 5 so that we can establish the baseline performance of HTTP traffic created by WebAvalanche and WebReflector. The HTTP traffic generated by both WebAvalanche and WebReflector is sustained at 200 Mbps with an average Web page size of 1,000 bytes. The foreground traffic is generated with the help of the Tester, which repeatedly replays, with the specified rate in the range [0, 40] Mbps, the IM/P2P Sniffer-captured traces of Section 5.1 and shown at Tables 1, 2, 7, and 9. In addition, our framework is configured to forward all identified IM/P2P sessions. Then, we integrate our module into FortiGate and repeat the experiments. In both settings, we measure the time elapsed between the launch of an HTTP request by WebAvalanche and the time the corresponding WebReflector-originating-reply arrives back. Table 15 shows the number of HTTP-sessions attempted as well as the minimum, maximum and average response times per request in microseconds. Case 1 of Table 15 shows the response time when only HTTP traffic is involved and our framework is not present in the testbed. The results for cases 2-6 are compiled while varying the intensity of IM/P2P traffic from 0 to 40 Mbps in the presence of our framework. In all our experiments here, there are no failed HTTP-sessions, our framework poses only minor increases in the average rates compared with the avg. time of case 1, and the minimum response times appear constant. However, the framework forces the response time to be occasionally as long as 2,112 microseconds when 40 Mbps of IM/P2P traffic is injected into the testbed. This deviation occurs only when the IM/P2P traffic accounts for the 17% of the total traffic (i.e., 40/240) and the combined traffic is 60% of the prorated bandwidth of the device(i.e., 240/400).
The Effectiveness of Suggested Framework in the Real World
We have evaluated our IM/P2P identification framework in real-world settings and in this section we discuss representative findings from the deployment of IM/P2P -identification-enabled FortiGate-800s at the edge of the network of three higher education institutions in France, P.R. of China and the U.S.A. In collecting networktraffic data, we used the layout of Figure 6 to capture, store and forward both confirmed and suspicious IM/P2P sessions to a Threat Analysis Center (TAC) for further verification and signature crafting purposes. To help discover new types of attacks and better ascertain the false-negative rate of FortiGate-800, we use a Suspicious Traffic Logger (STL) module to log streams and/or sessions that are potential yet not resolved/known IM/P2Ps . Such suspicious IM/P2P traffic is identified through various criteria including flows to default ports of already known IM/P2P applications, streams marked tentatively by our framework but lacking confirmation information, and sessions having obtained with only partial signature matching. Regional devices periodically transfer data of both detected IM/P2P and suspicious connections to TAC where the actual sampling and analyses of the traffic take place. Table 16 shows session statistics derived with the help of the deployed devices for traffic ultimately forwarded to TAC during the period of August 1st to 5th, 2006. The table presents both confirmed and suspected instances of top-ranked IM/P2P Table 16 . IM/P2P detected by our framework operating in networks in France, P.R. China and the U.S.A.
sessions for each observation day in columns cfm. and susp. respectively. The topthree IM/P2P types of identified sessions are due to eDonkey, BitTorrent (BT), and Gnutella whose cumulative number of sessions is by far larger than all remaining systems including KaZaA and Skype. Moreover, streams generated by P2Ps are exceedingly more voluminous than their IMs counterparts highlighting their ever increasing popularity and wide-spread use. Table 16 shows that the number of confirmed sessions for any specific IM/P2P type does not change significantly during the observation period implying that IM/P2P users have consistent behavior. For instance, the eDonkey sessions appear with a mean of 65,800 sessions per day and standard deviation 5,901 sessions. Similar observations are drawn for other IM/P2P types as well as suspicious sessions. It is worth pointing out that the volume of IM/P2P traffic in the above environments remains relatively stable on a daily basis and typically makes up about 10% of the total traffic.
Forwarding captured sessions to TAC offers the opportunity to examine in detail and verify the nature of sessions. In addition, it helps with the identification of new strains/versions of IM/P2P systems. As it is clearly infeasible to manually inspect every session, we resort to sampling and select 4,000 from those confirmed IM/P2P sessions. The sample maintains the same ratio of confirmed IM/P2Ps types in the forwarded traffic; within each type, sessions are selected randomly. For instance, we select 1,063 sessions from those confirmed BitTorrent flows as overall BitTorrent has a 27% session-presence (i.e., 188,464 BitTorrent-confirmed over the total number of 708,966 IM/P2P -confirmed sessions). Through manual examination by domain experts at TAC, we establish all IM/P2P sessions marked by the framework are indeed generated by IM/P2P systems.
From the captured sessions in the same period, we also randomly choose 4,000 suspect, yet not identified sessions. We carry out manual inspection and we draw the following observations: (1) Sessions not tentatively marked by our framework are verified that they are unlikely to be generated by known IM/P2P systems. By and large, these sessions are created by P2P applications using UDP messages to probe for the availability of servers and/or supernodes. UDP-probing to inactive nodes, also known as churn effect 75 , produces no information for our framework to conduct traffic correlation and so to successfully confirm the application type. In summary, our TAC-based analyses showed that the proposed framework generates no false positives/negatives for IM/P2P sessions. In its default mode, the module that implements the framework does not report failed attempts by IM/P2P applications to establish sessions. However, this can be addressed by configuring the module to produce alerts for tentatively marked UDP IM/P2P sessions in addition to all confirmed ones.
Using Other Open-Source Tools for Detecting IM/P2P
Sessions A few open-source projects can be used to detect IM/P2P sessions including Snort, Bro and IPP2P 59, 55, 21, 57 . Snort and Bro have been designed as intrusion detection/prevention systems (IDSs/IPSs) and base their operations on pattern matching methods. Through specially-crafted signatures, they can also detect IM/P2P traffic. Snort's steadily increasing user-group has created a wealth of pattern signatures. From such signatures currently available in the "out-of-the-box" configuration, only 2% can help in the detection of IM/P2P activity generated by AIM, Yahoo!, and BitTorrent. Table 17 in Appendix 8 presents a number of such Snort signatures. In its official build, Bro can only detect Gnutella and IRC and its capability of identifying IM/P2P traffic heavily relies on signatures imported from Snort; Table 18 shows pertinent signatures. On the other hand, the main objective of IPP2P has been to exclusively detect P2P systems exploiting telltale patterns that appear in ensued traffic. A few rules that IPP2P uses to carry out its session identification appear in Table 19. While experimenting with the signatures of Tables 17, 18 and 19 in both synthetic workloads and traces, we observe the following regarding Snort, Bro, and IPP2P:
• their capabilities mostly focus on the transport packet level rather than the application layer messages. Despite the fact that both Snort and Bro have builtin TCP reassembly features, their IM/P2P -related signatures do not exploit such features inevitably affecting their identification accuracy.
• their IM/P2P -related signatures are by and large designed to detect traffic on specific ports so that false positives are avoided. For example, source/destination ports are required in Snort signatures 1991, 2450, and 1382; the same applies for Bro signatures as well. Clearly, this is disadvantageous.
• they are ineffective when it comes to detecting IM/P2Ps system that offer different services via multiple transport mechanisms; the latter create diverse traffic characteristics any time different services are invoked. This is the case with KaZaA that produces entirely different traffic patterns in the login/authentication phase and the file downloading operations. In this regard, none of the Snort, Bro, and IPP2P can entirely block all KaZaA communications.
• they are "blind" to IM/P2Ps that use encryption to obfuscate their streams. In its official signature database, Snort provides no signature for TCP-based signalling traffic generated by KaZaA and Skype; similarly, IPP2P has no attempt to identify such traffic, either.
• they offer weak traffic correlation capabilities. Traffic correlation can be used to enhance IM/P2P identification accuracy, especially when uni-directional traffic signatures prove ineffective. Only, Snort provides limited traffic correlation functionality demonstrated by signatures 6000 and 6001 of Table 17 . It is worth pointing out that packet-based signatures also demonstrate different degree of effectiveness across the tools. For example, Bro signature s2b-1631-8 m offers improved detection accuracy over the Snort signature 1631 as it searches for a longer pattern. Compared to Snort signature 1383, IPP2P may yield better accuracy for KaZaA downloading traffic; Snort rule 1383 can only identify KaZaA downloading traffic connecting to TCP port 1214. Moreover, rule 1383 only checks the first four bytes of the packet to be "GET ". In contrast, IPP2P detects KaZaA media transfer traffic based on content instead of using fixed ports; furthermore, IPP2P not only ensures that the packet should begin with string "GET " but also contain either "X-Kazaa-Username:" or "User-Agent: PeerEnabler " reducing false positive/negative rates. In comparison to the above options, our framework avoids the use of fixed-ports, does not exclusively focus on packet-based signature m that is derived from Snort signature 1631 detection and exploits traffic correlation in a concerted effort to eliminate false positives/negatives. Last but not least, its extensibility through the use of plug-andplay analyzers enables the comprehensive treatment of both IM and P2P sessions in a unified manner.
Related Work
IM/P2Ps demonstrate traffic patterns that are very different from those created by traditional WWW-applications 23, 2, 78 . Although IM/P2Ps still heavily rely on the client/server paradigm for delivering services including authentication and authorization, they mainly follow the peer-to-peer paradigm when it comes to functionalities such as file sharing and signalling for the management of overlay networks 76,31,42,1 . Due to their "symmetric" communications, long data transfer times, and geographically dispersed resources, nodes in IM/P2P systems show significant consumption on both computational resources and network bandwidth 65, 45, 31 . The popularity of IM/P2Ps has also made them prime target for attacks including DOS attacks, disclosure of sensitive data, loss of data integrity, and host compromise or crash 6 . P2P systems including KaZaA, Grokster, and Morpheus suffer from spoofing identity attacks in their file request handling 6 and are vulnerable to DOS attacks, should malicious hosts repeatedly send large numbers of messages, and demonstrate buffer overflow problems in super-node packet handlers 6 . P2Ps appear to have a close relationship with spywares such as adwares, browser hijackers, keyloggers, and spybots 63 . Piggybacked on P2Ps and silently installed on clients, spywares can modify browser settings, track client's activities, display targeted advertisements, and even record passwords 33 . As computing infrastructures are undoubtedly affected by the resource-intensive and security-vulnerable IM/P2P applications, organizations have opted for restricting and/or blocking such traffic 56, 52 and a number of approaches have been proposed. Fixed-port IM/P2P classification methods, widely used by firewalls and traffic filters, base their operations on the assumption that IM/P2P applications always use their default ports 51, 69, 64, 25 . Heuristics have been also used to extract P2Ps packet patterns based on associations between source and destination IPaddresses/ports 39 , However, the rapid IM/P2P development along with the adoption of port hopping and message encapsulation render fixed-port approaches ineffective 70, 48 . Signature-based IM/P2P identification methods have been proposed to classify traffic according to unique patterns appeared in various data streams 18, 70 . Streams are pronounced to be P2P as long as their traffic contains respective telltales. Unfortunately, such methods can only recognize IM/P2P traffic as far as their file downloading activity is concerned and fail to identify encrypted streams and signalling communications often used for maintaining overlay networks 18, 70 . In addition, the packet-based pattern searching used in 70 is rather ineffective when a pattern spreads over multiple packets. The traffic monitor proposed in 38 examines sequences of bits to identify P2P signalling traffic from eDonkey, Gnutella, and Bit-Torrent. However, packet-based pattern matching and inspection on first 44 bytes of each packet only make the proposed method vulnerable to false positives and negatives. In 32 , an attempt to automatically generate signatures is discussed and aims at reducing costs often necessitated by the use of domain experts.
Statistical methods have been also proposed to identify IM/P2P traffic based on the aggregate behavior of data streams instead of the content of their flows. To this effect, both statistical and structural aspects of messages are used in conjunction with Markov process models and common substring graphs to characterize application streams in 48 . In 18 , a classification system for the identification of Internet relay chat (IRC) systems is discussed based on packet-size statistics in addition to fixed-port and telltale pattern matching. P2P statistical characteristics such as the percentage of failed connections as well as the ratio of initiated over received connections are used to identify P2Ps as well 3 . Furthermore, distributions of the packet inter-arrival time in flows are exploited by IM/P2P classifiers 39, 79 . Machine learning techniques such as Bayesian analysis have been also applied to IM/P2P traffic classifications 50 . Although statistical and machine learning techniques may assist in identifying traffic with encryption and encapsulation, the level of granularity such approaches operate in is coarse and often such method are unable to distinguish among various IM/P2Ps that take place simultaneously 48 . In addition, significant amounts of data in flows should be observed in order to ensure the validity of aggregated properties and subsequently their classification. The latter implies that the use of statistics and machine-learning-based approaches might not be an effective choice, should near-real-time manipulation of networking sessions is required 40, 79, 15 . Among other functions, intrusion detection/prevention systems (IDSs/IPSs) attempt to classify traffic of IM/P2P applications and subsequently manage it 59, 71, 40 . In order to deliver counter-actions on identified IM/P2P flows, IPSs typically employ hybrid approaches using port-and signature-based detection methods. For instance, with specially-crafted signatures, Snort, an open-source IPS, may identify IM/P2Ps including AIM and Gnutella, and its counter-measures on detected sessions include packet-dropping, session blocking, and/or connection termination 59, 73 . A number of products also provide IM/P2P traffic identification and manipulation functionalities including RealSecure, UnityOne and WatchDog 77, 56 . RealSecure may identify and block some IM/P2P traffic by predominantly using fixed ports and pattern matching 56 . The Peer-to-Peer Piracy Prevention module of UnityOne can restrict P2P traffic by setting policies and quotas for users based on fixed IP addresses and/or application types 77 . When integrated with firewalls and/or IPSs, WatchDog can detect, shape, and block P2P sessions 52 . In summary, most IM/P2P traffic classification methods identify IM/P2Ps control/data streams based on fixed port-numbers and packet-based inspection, and may generate false positives/negatives. In addition, many techniques can only identify IM/P2P media traffic but fail to recognize critical IM/P2P signalling messages. More importantly, they are not designed to be flexible and extensible to account with ease for new flavors of IM/P2P traffic without major rework in their internals.
Conclusions and Future Work
Sessions generated by Instant Messaging and Peer-to-Peer (IM/P2Ps) systems now constitute a significant portion of Internet traffic consuming network bandwidth and computing resources. Although IM/P2Ps present readily exploited vulnerabilities, users often consider them harmless and use them to share private information and sensitive data. Thus, it becomes imperative for organizations be able to identify, monitor, and manipulate IM/P2P traffic. The unique features of such traffic make detection increasingly difficult as new-breed IM/P2Ps systems resort to traffic hiding, security penetration techniques, port hopping, message encapsulation, and information encryption. In this paper, we propose a comprehensive framework to identify and control IM/P2P traffic in real-time. We resort to traffic re-assembly, stateful inspection, data stream correlation, application layer analysis as well as session-based pattern matching to classify traffic.
Our framework consists of four core-modules that operate synergistically, namely: Session Manager, Traffic Assembler, IM/P2P Dissector, and Traffic Arbitrator. The Session Manager organizes TCP/UDP connections so that sessions information can be efficiently managed. The Traffic Assembler re-constructs data within a stream so that they can be effectively handled as a sequence of application messages instead of a set of independent transport packets. We use splay/interval trees to organize the voluminous IM/P2P sessions and their associated streams with each stream likely consisting of numerous packets. The operation of the IM/P2P Dissector module is based on specific protocol analyzers that can be deployed in an plug-and-play fashion. The analyzers interpret each application message according to protocol specifications defined by individual IM/P2P services. This analysis goes beyond conventional syntactic inspection as it exploits semantics including order and relationships of messages in different directions of the flows. We have designed analyzers for a wide range of IM systems such as AIM, MSN, Yahoo!, and Jabber, as well as for P2P systems including Gnutella, KaZaA, eDonkey, BitTorrent, DirectConnect, and Skype. As soon as our framework identifies an IM/P2P session, the Traffic Arbitrator module helps control and/or manipulate the corresponding streams with counter-measures including packet dropping and connection termination in a configurable manner. We have implemented our framework and tested it in a wide range of settings to demonstrate its capabilities. Our experiments in both controlled settings and real networks show that our prototype raises no false positives or false negatives, identifies IM/P2P traffic correctly when traffic is encapsulated or encrypted. Finally, our framework does not affect system performance noticeably in terms of throughput and response time.
In the future, we intend to enhance our framework with analyzers for other IM/P2P systems such as Winny, WinMX, and EarthStation. In addition, we also continuously update our framework to identify new-breed IM/P2P systems and their variances, especially the upcoming versions of the very popular Skype system. We anticipate that a very large number of coexisting analyzers may put significant strain on our framework implementation that has to be addressed. We also intend to thoroughly evaluate the framework's requirements on resources, and its behavior under conditions of unusual traffic load.
Appendices
8.1. Snort-rules for Identifying IM/P2P Sessions Signature-based traffic classification methods are widely used in IM/P2P session detection, which mostly entails searching for telltale patterns in data flows, specific message exchange styles, and/or abnormal values in various protocol fields. In this regard, Snort, an open-source IDS/IPS, is a good example 73, 59 . Pattern matching is the predominant IM/P2P detection methods employed by Snort and some of such IM/P2P -specific signatures are presented in Table 17 , here, each signature is assigned an identifier presented in column "sid". Signature 1631 identifies an AIM login session by matching the packet's destination IP address with one of those AIM servers provided in variable $AIM SERVERS (e.g., 64.12.24.0/24, 64.12.25.0/24, where /24 is the network mask). Qualified packets are further inspected to ensure that their TCP-payload start with character sequence of "*|01|". This rule fails to detect an AIM session connecting to servers not included in $AIM SERVERS; in addition, AIM sessions escape Snort detection when message boundaries are not honored by the underlying transport services. False positives may also occur as the rule only checks the first two bytes of the packet payload. The intend of signatures 1991 and 2450 is to trap MSN and Yahoo! IM sessions, respectively. However, by inspecting only TCP-sessions with destination ports 1863 or source port 5050, these rules miss all sessions with source/destination ports latching to ports rather than their default ones. For instance, both MSN and Yahoo! provide port hopping mechanism to locate servers, the former sweeps ports 1863 and 80, while the latter scans ports 23, 80, 25, 119, and 20 in addition to its default port 5050. Furthermore, Signatures 1631, 1991, and 2450 may generate false alarms as they check only traffic in one-direction. If string GNUTELLA CONNECT is found within the first 40 bytes of a TCP-packet sent to a server, signature 556 marks the session involved as Gnutella. KaZaA sessions used for file downloads can be detected with signature 1383 only if such sessions happen to use the default TCP port 1214, such traffic is rare in nowadays KaZaA networks. In contrast to the above signatures that function individually and independently, signatures 6000 and 6001 are crafted to work together in order to identify Skype login sessions. By monitoring traffic from client to server, signature 6000 verifies that the packet starts with pattern "|16 03 01 00 CD|", if so, the session will be marked as Skype, but no alert is generated yet at this stage. The session is declared as true Skype only after conditions specified in signature 6001 are also satisfied by the traffic from server to client of the same session; the conditions in signatures 6001 state that the packet must start with pattern "|16 03 01 00 CD|" and the session in question has been marked as Skype by signature 6000. In essence, signatures 6000 and 6001 attempt to correlate the packets exchanged between client and server, but in a coarse granularity as they operate on packet level instead of IM/P2P Table 17 . Rules used in Snort to detect IM/P2P sessions message level. However, compared to signatures that only inspect uni-directional data stream of sessions, such stream correlation techniques definitely improve IM/P2P traffic classification accuracy. Overall, state-of-the-art devices identify IM/P2Ps traffic based on packet boundaries in the transport layer instead of using divisions at the application level. Signatures based on standard and fixed ports are likely to miss all IM/P2Ps sessions due to use of port hopping and message encapsulation.
Detecting IM/P2P Sessions using Bro
A Unix-based IDS, Bro passively monitors network traffic and may detect suspicious activities by parsing/extracting application-level telltale patterns 55, 54, 43 . Bro has been developed primarily as a research platform and thus, it is used either for experimental purposes or to help verify results of other IDS systems. Developed around the libpcap library, Bro carries out filtering of packet streams based on policies, then its event-engine classifies filtered streams into events which are finally processed by its script interpreter. Suspicious activities designated by user-authored policy scripts are ultimately recorded by the script interpreter. The IDS counter-actions include generation of e-mail/paging messages, termination of connections and shaping of traffic with the help of external programs. Bro features only a few signatures and policy scripts as far as IM/P2P traffic is concerned. In its most recent version (1.1d), only portions of IRC and Gnutella traffic can be detected in Bro's default configuration. Due to the esoteric nature of Bro scripting, the most convenient way to use the tool is through importation of Snort rules. Table 18 . Rules used in Bro to identify IM/P2P traffic procedure; it monitors the TCP stream to the server that starts with pattern "*|02|" followed by string "|00 17 00 06|". Compared to Snort signature with sid 1631 of Table 17 , we can observe that both signatures try to identify the same AIM traffic, however, they inspect different telltale patterns. The reason is that signature s2b-1631-8 is derived from Snort rule with revision 8, while sid 1631 of Table 17 is with revision 6. Clearly, Snort revises its rules progressively in order to improve its detection accuracy. Similarly, Snortrule sid 2450 and Bro signature s2b-2452-4 identify Yahoo! IM traffic. However these two signatures search for different Yahoo! IM service types; s2b-2452-4 looks for the ping service, while 2450 inspects the login service. Both signatures s2b-2180-2 and s2b-2181-2 are designed to identify BitTorrent's tracker and peer communications; the former searches for patterns "GET", "/announce", "info hash=", and "event=started", while the latter looks for pattern "|13|BitTorrent protocol". As Bro mainly relies on signatures imported from Snort, its capabilities can only be as powerful as those of Snort. Moreover, Bro is further limited as it does not support Snort' flow correlation and byte-wise operations.
IPP2P-signatures for Detecting P2P Sessions
IPP2P builds its functionality around the combined use of iptables and netfilter and searches for telltales unique to P2P flows 57 . The tool can impose traffic logging, packet dropping, traffic shaping to limit both bandwidth and system resource consumption. A noteworthy limitation of IPP2P is that it cannot deal with P2Ps that may create diverse stream types such as Skype. Also, IPP2P only recognizes some of the UDP-signalling of KaZaA and is completely "blind" to all KaZaA TCP-based signalling messages. Version 0.8.2 of IPP2P can recognize twelve P2P systems when it comes to their TCP traffic (including Gnutella, eDonkey, and BitTorrent) and five UDP-traffic generating packages (including Direct Connect, BitTorrent, and KaZaA). Table 19 outlines a few rules used by IPP2P for pattern matching at packet level. Should a DirectConnect command be delivered in multiple TCP packets as it happens traffic type traffic characteristics inspected TCP-based P2P traffic eDonkey protocol tag (1 byte); message length (2 bytes); message type (1 byte) and should be "Hello" or "Hello-Answer" DirectConnect packet starts with "$" and ends with "|"; command after "$" should be either "Lock" or "MyNick"; Gnutella packet ends with characters "carriage return (0x0D)" and "new line (0x0A)"; pkt starts with "GNUTELLA CONNECT/", "GNUTELLA/", or "Get /get/"; for the latter, packet should further contain "X-Gnutella-" or "X-Queue:"; KaZaA packet ends with characters "carriage return (0x0D)" and "new line (0x0A)"; packet starts with "GIVE " or "GET /"; for the latter, packet should further contain "X-Kazaa-Username: " or "User-Agent: PeerEnabler/"; BitTorrent packet starts with "|13|BitTorrent protocol" or "GET /"; for the latter, packet should further contain "scrape?info hash=" or "announce?info hash="; UDP-based P2P traffic eDonkey checked fields: protocol tag (1 byte); message type (1 byte); packet length; not detect eMule and Overnet DirectConnect pkt starts with "$" and ends with "|"; command after "$" should be "SR " or "Ping "; Gnutella packet starts with "GND" or "GNUTELLA "; KaZaA packet ends with "KaZaA|00|"; BitTorrent mainly check packet length and some fields with constant values; for instance, when payload is 16 bytes, first 8 bytes should be |00 00 04 17 27 10 19 80|; Table 19 . Rules used in IPP2P to identify TCP/UDP P2P traffic frequently, then the command start and end delimiters $ and | may appear in different packets. The latter will evade the check carried out by IPP2P and will ultimately lead to false negative. Another known limitation of IPP2P is that it identifies only a limited set of message types for any specific P2P system. For example, among the eDonkey's more than 100 message types, only two can be successfully dealt by IPP2P. Furthermore, IPP2P only attempts to identify KaZaA's downloading data flows, while for its signalling traffic, IPP2P detects UDP-based signalling messages, letting KaZaA TCP-based signalling traffic go completely undetected. Finally, due to lack of any traffic correlation, IPP2P may generate false positives. To go beyond the packet-based telltale examination, IPP2P have to jointly work with other packages such as CLASSIFY and CONNMARK to process P2P streams at the session level.
